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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Congress and the federal courts is at a
low ebb. Judges at all levels of the judiciary have spoken out recently
about perceived threats to their independence.' The organized bar
1. ChiefJustice Rehnquist spoke on the subject ofjudicial independence at a conference
on the future of the federal courts atnAmerican University, Washington College of Law. See Chief
Justice Speaks on Independence THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1996, at 1. For a text of the Chief
Justice's remarks, see Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts,46 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 267-74
(1996). Four current and former chief judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently criticized the vociferous public attacks (some of them from Congress) onJudge
Harold Baer, Jr., who had suppressed evidence in a drug prosecution. See Henry J. Reske,
Questions of Independence, A.BA J., June 1996, at 110 (detailing response written by Judges
Wilfred Feinberg,J. Edward Lumbard, Jon 0. Newman, andJames L. Oaks to attacks on Judge
Baer). Senior Judge Barefoot Sanders of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas commented on the importance ofjudicial independence to the credibility of the courts.
SeeJudge Barefoot Sanders and Committee Address JudicialConcerns, THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1996,
at 10, 11. Judges have expressed these concerns privately as well. In her capacity as Chair of
theJudicial Conference Committee on theJudicial Branch,Judge Deanell Reece Tacha received
numerous letters from other judges, the contents of which she described as follows:

These letters gave me increasing concern. Thoughtful jurists, none of whom falls
within the category of those who simply seek additional comforts or resources beyond
their needs, are echoing a growing refrain of concern aboutwhether the independence
of the federaljudiciary is being gradually eroded. The letters contain a sense of sorrow
and urgency, asking the judiciary itself and, implicitly, the other branches of
government, to consider the importance of protecting the independence of the
judiciary.
Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciaryfor the Third Century, 46 MERCER L. REV. 645,
647 (1995).
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and the academy are devoting renewed attention to the relationship
between Congress and the courts.2 In addition, the division of
authority between the two branches has been the subject of several
recent decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States. In
1995, the Court held that Congress violated the principle of separation of powers in a 1991 statute that required courts to reopen certain
final judgments.3 The Court earlier had given a very broad interpretation to the inherent power of the federal courts.4 These events,
taken together, are evidence of a serious and ongoing conflict.
A primary source of the conflict is the judiciary's budget The
budget crises of 1995 threatened to close the courts.5 Twice in the
last ten years the courts have had to suspend civil jury trials because
Congress did not appropriate the money to pay juror fees and
expenses. 6 Congress also has imposed numerous obligations on the
courts without appropriating additional money to cope effectively with
them. 7 The judicial branch perceives this insensitivity, if not hostility,
to its fiscal needs as a threat to its independence. As one Circuit
Judge has written, "Independentjudicial action requires an appropriate level of support which allows a judge to carry out the judicial

2. The American Bar Association Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements recently
appointed a task force to study concerns about separation of powers andjudicial independence.
SeeJohn Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.BA J., Nov. 1996 at 50, 51. The Mercer Law Review recently
published a symposium devoted to the issue. See FederalJudicialIndependence Symposium, 46
MERCER L. REV. 637 (1995).
3. SeePlautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447,1463 (1995) (striking down § 27A(b)
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as unconstitutional because it required federal courts to
reopen finaljudgments entered before its enactment); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503
U.S. 429, 438 (1992) (upholding subsection (b) (6) (A) of Northwest Timber Compromise
despite Respondent's challenge that Congress violated Article III because Act directed particular
decision in cases without repealing or amending status underlying litigation).
4. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-55 (1991) (detailing historical
interpretation of inherent powers of federal courts and holding that district court acted within
its discretion in assessing attorneys fees as sanction for bad faith conduct).
5. See Press Release on Behalf of the Executive Committee of the Judidal Conference of the United
States (Jan. 4, 1996) <http://www.uscourts.gov> (on file with The American UniversityLaw Review)
[hereinafter Press Releasel. For a detailed discussion of how the judiciary and Congress have
come into conflict recently over thejudiciary's budget, see infraPart I and sources cited therein.
6. See Patrick E. Longan, The CaseforJuryFees in FederalCivil Litigation, 74 OR.L. REv. 909,
920-22 (1995) (stating that in both 1986 and 1993, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts sent
memoranda to all district judges instructing them to halt jury trials until Congress could pass
supplemental appropriations to fund civil juries).
7. Examples include: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994); The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); The Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992,
15 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994); and the Child Support RecoveryAct of 1992,
18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). For a detailed discussion of these statutes and others in which Congress
has increased the workload of the courts without coordinating the provision of resources, see
infra Part I.
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function without relying on other entities [or]
depending on
8
someone else's assessment of the judge's needs."
Another battleground is for control of procedure in the federal
courts.9 Since 1934, most of the control has been in the hands of the
judiciary. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court was
given the power to promulgate rules of procedure for the federal
courts. 10 In recent years, however, Congress has inserted itself
directly into making or shaping procedural rules. Congress passed
the Civil Justice Reform Act in 1990 and mandated that each district
at least consider the adoption of certain techniques designed to
reduce the cost and duration of federal civil litigation." Even more
recently, Congress has taken upon itself the task of legislating new
procedures for securities fraud cases and, as part of the Republican
"Contract with
America," has tried to enact numerous other procedur2
al reforms.1
At this propitious time, the Judicial Conference of the United States
has issued a Long Range Planfor the Federal Courts.'" The Long Range
Plan contains a number of proposals, the purposes of which are to
defuse the current situation with Congress and to structure a
relationship between Congress and the courts that will preserve the
independence of the judiciary. 4 If these proposals are put into

8. See Tacha, supranote 1, at 648.
9. For a detailed discussion of how Congress and the federal courts have collided over
procedure, see infra Part I.
10. SeeRules EnablingAct of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994). Fora general discussion
of the background and operation of the Rules Enabling Act, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A SUMMARY FOR BENCH AND
BAR (1993). For additional information and some proposals for changes, see Peter G. McCabe,
Renewal of the FederalRulemaking Process,44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1675-91 (1995). Mr. McCabe
is Secretary to the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure. See id at 1655 n.*.
11. See CiviIJustice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482. See generally PatrickJohnston,
Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833 (1994)
(critiquing CivilJustice Reform Act).
12. SeeDavid C. Weiner, Reform orDeformedLegislation,21 LrTI. 1,1-2 (1995) (listingspecific
proposed reforms in "Contract with America"). One proposal of the "Contract with America"
was that a series of court reforms entitled the "Common Sense Legal Reform Act" should be
enacted. See idUat 1. Those reforms were embodied in H.R. 10, which the 104th Congress
passed early in its first session. See id. at 1. For a discussion of the fate of these reforms, which
eventually were divided into three separate bills, see infra Part II.C. For background on the
origin of many of the reforms in H.R. 10, see PRESIDF.NT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
AGENDA FOR CWILJUSTICE REFORM INAMERICA (1991).
13. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. For background on the Long Range Plan, see
Richard B. Hoffman & William C. Lucianovic, Long Range Planning: A Reality in the Judidal
Branch, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1599, 1602-07 (1995).
14. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 57-70, 93-108 (discussing possible areas for
innovation such as Rules of Practice and Procedure, criminal sentencing, jury system, pro se
litigation, cost of litigation, and need for case management). For a detailed discussion of these
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effect, the confrontation may be avoided. The Long Range Plan a
conservative document, 5 however, and it may not go far enough
toward protecting the courts from Congress. The purposes of this
Article are to describe how the relationship between Congress and the
courts has evolved in recent years, to discuss how the Long Range Plan
proposes to solve the problems, and to propose several additional
solutions. Part I details the recent battles over the budget and related
issues. Part II explores how Congress and the courts have collided
over regulation of federal procedure. Part III discusses the Long
Range Plan and additional proposals that will preserve the independence of the courts and respect the proper role of Congress.
Congress and the courts should not and need not be on a collision
course. Solutions that respect the appropriate role for each, such as
those proposed in the Long Range Planand in this Article, will help to
resolve the present situation and to refocus both branches on delivery
of justice rather than on the protection of prerogative.
I.

A.

CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIARY'S BUDGET

ExpansiveJurisdictionand Unfunded Mandates

A superficial observer would conclude that the federal judiciary has
been treated quite well in recent years. In the last fifteen years, many
state court systems have been in dire condition because of
underfunding. 6 During that same time period, the budget of the
federal judiciary has increased 170%.11 This growth rate is more
than four times the growth rate of the federal budget as a whole."8
A superficial observer would miss, however, the fact that Congress has
expanded the responsibilities of the federal courts even faster than it
has expanded the judiciary's budget. 9 Under the established
numerical workload guidelines for the federal courts, recent budgets

proposals, see infra Part III.
15. See William W. Schwarzer, Very Separated Powers, THE RECORDER, Dec. 22, 1995, at 6,
availablein LEXIS, Cal Library, Recrdr File (stating that plan proposes primarily adherence to
current policies and basically is vote for status quo).
16. For a detailed description of the funding problems at the state court level, see
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON FUNDING THEJUSTICE SYS.: A CALL TO ACTION
[hereinafter A CALL TO ACION].

(1992)

17. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 11 (stating that increase in funding is due
primarily to growth ofjudiciary's staff).
18. See id. (stating that 170% increase injudiciary's budget is comparable to 171% increase
in budget of Department of Justice).
19. See id. at 94. 'The regrettable reality is that while recent judicial budgets have shown
sizeable increases, the increases have not kept pace with the volume and costs of additional tasks
that the courts have assumed under new congressional mandates. Insufficient resources are
ultimately a threat to judicial branch independence." Id.
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have fallen short of fully funding the responsibilities of the judiciary.
The 1988 budget fell $50 million short in operating funds.2 0 The
1989 budget was almost $100 million less than needed to maintain
operations.2 The 1992 shortfall resulted in a hiring freeze and the
suspension of substance abuse treatment programs and of plans to
repair or replace the judiciary's computer systems.22 The 1993
budget was $200 million short of what was needed to keep pace, and
the 1994 budget fell $400 million short of the amount necessary to
fund fully the responsibilities that Congress had placed on the
courts.23

Thus, although it might appear to a superficial observer

that Congress has been generous in the rate of growth of the
judiciary's budget, 24 it becomes evident that Congress has been quite
stingy when the budget is judged relative to the demands that
Congress has made on the judiciary.
Congress repeatedly has left the courts with responsibilities but no
resources to fulfill them. One example is the payment of juror fees.
Litigants in most cases in federal court are entitled to a jury under
the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 26 By statute,
jurors are paid $40 per day. In 1986, and again in 1993, Congress
did not appropriate sufficient funds to pay jurors the daily fees to
which they are entitled by statute.28 In 1986, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts sent a memorandum to all federal district
judges that read in part:
[C]iviljury trials will have to be suspended onJune 16 through the
end of the fiscal year (September 30).... [T] he Judicial Conference has directed that you empanel no new civil juries from June
16 forward. . . . [T]his suspension [of civil jury trials] must

20. See Congress CutsJudiciary'sFund Request by Five Percent, But Available Funds Greater Than
in FY87, THE THiRD BRANCH, Feb. 1988, at 1, 1.
21. See PresidentSigns FY89Judiciary Appropriation,THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1988, at 1, 1.
22. See 102d CongressAdjourns: Results Are Mixed BagforJudiciary,THE THIRD BRANCH, OCL
1992, at 1, 2.

28. See Longan, supranote 6, at 924.
24. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 93-94 (stating that Congress has provided
judiciary with resources increasing at same rate as those allotted to Department ofJustice).
25. See id. (stating that increases in judicial budgets have not kept pace with costs of
additional tasks courts assumed under congressional mandates).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Supreme Court recently has made an expansive
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial. See Chauffeurs Local 391 v. Terry,
494 U.S. 558, 561 (1990) (holding that Seventh Amendment right to jury trial applies to breach
of duty of fair representation by labor union); Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,
64 (1989) (finding that constitutional right to jury trial applies to suit by bankruptcy trustee to
recover fraudulent transfer).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1871(b) (1) (1994).
28. See Longan, supra note 6, at 920-27 (discussing Congress' actions and proposing
solutions to funding problems).
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continue in effect until we inform you that sufficient funds have
been made available ....
This memorandum left the federal courts with a constitutional
obligation to hold jury trials but without funds to pay jurors their
statutory fees." Two courts held that the cessation of jury trials
because of a lack of funds was unconstitutional." Only a supplemental appropriation late in the fiscal year averted the potential collision
of the budget with the Seventh Amendment.3 2 In 1993, a similar
episode occurred but again was staved off by a similar supplemental
appropriation. 3
The same pattern emerged in 1990 when Congress passed the Civil
Justice Reform Act3 4 and imposed numerous obligations on the
district courts. 5 Each district court had to appoint an advisory
group to assess the existing docket, to identify trends in case filings,
to identify the principal causes of expense and delay in the district,
and to examine "the extent to which costs and delays could be
reduced by a better assessment of the impact of new legislation on the
courts."3 6 Each group then had to recommend particular reforms
to reduce expense and delay in light of local conditions. 37 Congress
did not, however, include the funds necessary for carrying out these
mandates in the appropriation for the Judiciary for the 1991 fiscal

29. Armster v. United States Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986).
30. See id at 1426-27.
31. See id.at 1430 (concluding specifically that Seventh Amendment is violated by
suspension for significant period of time); Hobson v. Brennan, 637 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D.D.C.
1986) (stating that indefinite suspension ofjury trials in anticipation of future shortage of funds
violates Seventh Amendment).
32. See Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriations;FundsAvailablefor CivilJury Trials,THE
THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1986, at 2 (reporting that Congress had approved urgent appropriations
bill that provided $3.8 million in funding forjurors' fees thereby averting suspension of civil jury
trials).
33. See President Signs FY93 SupplementalBill, THE THIRD BRANCH, July 1993, at 1.
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994).
35. The hearings on that legislation and companion provisions that expanded the size of
the federal judiciary also provided the occasion for some public displays of the tensions between
Congress and the courts. After some accusations were made in the media that SenatorJoseph
Biden (D-Del.), then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was "playing politics" with
the new judgeships, Senator Biden made a searing opening statement on the last day of
hearings. The CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990 and the JudicialImprovements Act of 1990: Hearings
on S.2027 and S.2648 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiiary,101st Cong. 308 (1990) (statement
of Sen. Biden).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(A)-(D).
37. See id. § 472(b) (3).
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appropriation, almost a year later, to
year." It took a supplemental
39
funds.
necessary
provide the
The Civil Rights Act of 199140 and the Americans With Disabilities
Act of 199041 are two more recent examples. Since the enactment
of these statutes, civil rights filings in the federal courts have risen
eighty-six percent after five years of stability.42 Neither of these
statutes, however, contained budgetary authorization to take care of
this increased workload.
Congress followed a similar pattern in 1992. Among the topics of
legislation passed that year with serious fiscal consequences for the
judiciary were the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992,"s the Child
Support Recovery Act of 1992, 44 the Animal Enterprise Protection
Act of 1992," 5 the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992,46 and the Federal
Courts Administration Act of 1992." 7 These bills created initial
budgetary obligations of more than $18 million and recurring
obligations of over $26 million, yet Congress included no money for
these programs in the fiscal 1993 budget.48 A year later, some partial
funding was allocated.49
In 1994, two of the most important pieces of legislation under
consideration by Congress were the crime bill5" and various health

38. See FundingGuidelinesApprovedfor CivilJusticeReform Implementation, THE THIRD BRANCH,
May 1991, at 4 (stating thatJudicial Conference Executive Committee directed courts to submit
requests for funds necessary for implementing Civil Justice Reform Act for remainder of fiscal
year 1991).
39. See id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
41. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
42. See Press Release of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (June 24, 1996)
<http://www.uscourts.gov> (on file with The American University Law Review).
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 152 (1994).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
45. Id. § 43.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 376, 1295, 2412.
48. SeeJudiciary FY93 and FY94 Appropriations Requests on Center Stage, THE THIRD BRANCH,
Mar. 1993, at 1, 3-4. Eighth Circuit ChiefJudge Richard S. Arnold testified before Congress in
connection with the Judiciary's 1993 budget and reflected:
At the same time that Congress is adding to the growing workload, the Judiciary is
being asked to tighten its belt and keep providing the same level and quality ofjustice
to the citizenry with less than necessary funding. The Judiciary cannot continue to
absorb growing workloads and maintain an acceptable level of service to the public.
We are seeking funding to maintain that level of service to fund our most critical
needs.
Id. at 3.
49. SeeDepartment ofJustice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-121, 107 Stat. 1153 (appropriating funds for federal court administration for 1994 fiscal year
and anti-car theft bill).
50. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223).
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care reform bills.51 The crime bill became law and imposed many
new obligations on the federal courts. 2 Initially, the House of
Representatives did not take these obligations into account when it
passed thejudiciary's appropriation.53 Health care legislation, which
did not pass, also would have increased the workloads of the federal
courts.5 4 At the time that Congress passed the judiciary's appropriation for fiscal 1995, passage of health care reform appeared likely.
Congress, however, did not authorize any funds to handle the
anticipated larger caseload.55
The most recent reports indicate that, far from taking steps to
ensure that resources are provided to accommodate all the demands
placed on the judiciary, the Republican Congress is taking an even
closer-some would say hostile-look at judicial spending.5 6 The
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has written
that he is pessimistic about the willingness of Congress to support the
judiciary.57 There are abundant recent examples. One rider to the
judiciary's free-standing 1996 appropriations bill requires the courts
to limit the cost of judicial conferences.58 Congress has closely
scrutinized courthouse construction projects in recent years and even
has rescinded $79 million in construction funds in 1995."9 Another
recent bill would have created an inspector general's position within
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to monitor expenditures.' Congress has displayed a consistent pattern in recent years

51. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993, S. 1757, 104th Cong. (1994); H.R. 3600, 104th
Cong. (1994).
52. SeeFindingGuide to Violent Crime Controland Law EnforcementAct, 55 Grim. L. Rep. (BNA)
2429, 2431 (1994) (listing numerous new federal crimes established by Act).
53. See Budget Passed by House Falls Short ofJudiciary'sFY95 Needs, THE THIRD BRANCH July
1994, at 1 (stating that House funding level was cause for concern because small increase in
appropriations from 1994 was insufficient even to maintain judiciary's existing services).
54. See id.
55. See Department ofJustice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. LANo.
103-317, 108 Stat. 1725 (appropriating funds for fiscal year 1995).
56. See Mark Hansen, Court Spending Under Review, A.BA.J., Feb. 1996, at 24, 24 (asserting
that Congress recently has begun to question everything from Judiciary's spending on
conferences and courthouses to its commitment to weeding out waste and abuse).
57. See L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to the Symposium on FederalJudicialAdministration:
Stewardship in a Changing Environment, 14 MIss. C. L. REv. 193, 194 (1994).
58. SeeJudiciarySecures FY96 Funding,THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1996, at 1, 10 [hereinafter
FY96 Funding].
59. See PresidentSigns FY95 SupplementalAppropriationsBill, THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1995,
at 3, 3.
60. See Schwarzer, supra note 15, at 6. Judge Schwarzer, who recently completed a term as
Director of the FederalJudicial Center, described the current situation with Congress as follows:
The courts estimate that they need an increase of 10 percent just to maintain
current services. But Congress appears to be turning a deaf ear to thejudiciary's pleas.
It is taking the position that the courts must take cutsjust like everyone else, and they
may receive only a fraction of what they need.
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of giving the judiciary insufficient resources to meet the demands
placed upon it. But this pattern, consistent as it is, is not the most
dramatic evidence of tension between Congress and the courts
regarding money. That evidence comes from the budget shutdowns
of the fall of 1995 and winter of 1995-96.61
B.

The Government Shutdown

When the budget impasse between President Clinton and the
Republican Congress shut the government down in November 1995,
the judiciary's response included cancellation of training, reduction
of travel by court personnel, and furloughs for two-thirds of the staff
of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.62 On December 7,
1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to ask for a freestanding funding bill for the judiciary in order to take the federal
courts out of the crossfire.63 The Chief Justice expressed his fear
that the budget impasse was jeopardizing the operation of the
64

courts.

That plea yielded no immediate results. During the second
government shutdown, the judiciary used revenue from filing fees to
continue operating, but concerns about the continued functioning of
the courts grew.6" The Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference issued a press release on January 4, 1996, to describe the
consequences of a continued funding lapse:
Ourjustice system will be seriously disrupted. Judges will be unable
to conductjury trials. Indictments against criminal defendants may
have to be dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act. Injunctive orders
What's more, Congress has called for an improvement in the efficiency of the courts.
In its report on the appropriations bill, the House committee stated that "it expects the
Judicial Conference to initiate an in-depth review of ways to make the judiciary more
efficient and less costly. The review shall be performed by an independent,
nonpartisan, professional organization outside the judiciary, but with the complete

cooperation and support of the judiciary."

It looks as though this is only the

beginning.
Id.
61. See An Inside Look at the Shutdown, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1995, at 1, 2 (stating that
during government budget shutdown in December 1995, courts encountered numerous issues
relating to daily operations and spent disproportionate amount of time addressing funding
lapse).
62. See id. at 1-3 (discussing, in detail, impact of 1995 government shutdown).
63. See ChiefJusticeActs on Budget Crisis, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1995, at 1, 1 (reprinting
copy of Chief Justice Rehnquist's letter sent December 7, 1995, to Vice President Gore and
Speaker Gingrich).
64. See id.
65. See FY96 Funding,supranote 58, at 10 (stating that Chair of Executive Committee, Chief
Judge Gil Merritt, expressed concern that our system of law and order would break down
because of lack of funds).
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against violations of the law (for example, air and water pollution
and abridgement of constitutional rights) and money judgments
awarded to victims may in large measure go unenforced.
Under such circumstances, a breakdown in our system of
constitutional order and law enforcement may occur. The judges,
working alone in the absence of appropriated funds will do their
best to maintain order, but our normal system ofjustice cannot be
guaranteed to our citizens during this period.'
OnJanuary 6,1996, in response to the plea of the ChiefJustice and
the Judicial Conference and after enormous efforts by members of
the judiciary, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and
sympathetic legislators, Congress passed, and the President signed, an
appropriation bill for all of fiscal year 1996.67 That Congress would
permit matters to reach the precipice of the closing of the courts,
however, is dramatic evidence of the ongoing tension between the two
branches.
C.
1.

The Line-Item Veto and the Grassley Questionnaire

The line-item veto

The recent line-item veto legislation raises another concern for the
Under this bill, the President may veto particular
judiciary.'
appropriations for any funding other than the salaries of'judges and
certain retirement programs.69 The Judicial Conference of the
United States repeatedly has expressed concern about the line-item
veto. A primary concern is that the President is the head of the
executive branch, which is the most fTequent litigant in federal
court. ° The fear is that the threat of a line-item veto could impair
the independence of the judiciary in cases involving the executive
branch. Currently, elaborate procedures are in place to insulate the
judiciary's budget from control by the executive branch.7 ' These

66. Press Release, supra note 5.
67. See FY96 Funding,supranote 58, at 10.
68. For general discussions of the implications of the line item veto on the separation of
powers, see Robert Destro, Whom Do You Trust?, 44 THE FED. LAW. 26 (1997); and Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1836-39 (1996).
69. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (to be codified at
2 U.S.C. § 691) (giving President authority to veto appropriations if he determines that they will
reduce federal budget deficit without impairing essential government functions or harming
national interest).
70. See Line Item Veto LegislationRaisesSeparationofPowers Concern%,THE THIRD BRANCH, Apr.
1996, at 4 (stating thatjudiciary's concern over President's ability to exercise line item veto and
to rescind funding to judiciary will seriously threaten even-handed administration ofjustice).
71. The current procedure is for the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts to submit the courts' budget to the Office of Management and Budget, which then is
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procedures were created in the 1930s when the funds for the judiciary
came from the Department of Justice and when judges frequently
complained about having to plead with the Justice Department for
resources.12 The protections and independence that the procedures
are intended to assure could disappear with the exercise of the lineitem veto. By including the judiciary in this legislation, Congress has
threatened further the operation, and perhaps the independence, of
the judicial branch.
The Grassley questionnaire

2.

A related development is the questionnaire sent to federal judges
by Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) in his capacity as chair of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts. The survey was directed to all active and seniorjudges on the
courts of appeals and the district courts and asked questions
regarding workload and outside work activities.7 3 The Judicial
Conference encouraged judges to complete the survey, but promised
Senator Grassley that it also would provide an institutional response
on behalf of the judiciary. The chair of the Judicial Conference's
Executive Committee, Chief Judge Gilbert Merritt, indirectly
expressed some trepidation about Grassley's survey when he noted
that Congress in the past has directed requests for information to the
Judicial Conference rather than to individual judges. 4 Thejudiciary
has reason to fear Senator Grassley's motives in seeking the information. Senator Grassley has been an outspoken opponent to expansion
of the federal judiciary and has held hearings about the possible
elimination of some judgeships." He may intend to use the information tojustify reducing congressional support of the courts. In the
context of the ongoing budgetary problems between Congress and
the courts, Senator Grassley's survey is an ominous sign. It is further
evidence of continuing tension between Congress and the federal
courts.

supposed to submit the request to Congress without change. See 28 U.S.C. § 605 (1994); 31
U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1994). For background on this process and its origins, see Gordon Bermant
& Russell R. Wheeler, Federaljudges and theJudicialBranch: TheirIndependence and Accountability,
46 MERCER L. REV. 835, 848-50 (1995).
72. See Schwarzer, supra note 15, at 6.
73.

See Conference Will Submit InstitutionalResponseto Grassley Survey, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb.

1996, at 12.
74.

See id.

75. SeeSchwarzer, supranote 15, at 6 (noting that Iowa Senator held hearings to determine
if some judgeships are no longer needed).
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D.

The Effects of Continued Underfunding
The imbalance between the demands placed on the judiciary and
the resources Congress provides must be corrected. The drafters of
the Long Range Plancarefully studied the trends in the growth of the
federal caseload to forecast what the federal courts will look like in
the year 2020.76 They studied two scenarios, the first of which
assumed that Congress would not limit the growth of federal
jurisdiction, but would be relatively generous with resources. That
scenario, particularly the projected fourfold expansion of the number
of federal judges, would bring its own problems.77 The second
scenario assumed that Congress would continue the present course
and neither limit growth nor provide the funding necessary to
accommodate that growth. That scenario turned out to be nightmarish.78 Here is how the Long Range Plan attempts to dramatize the
consequences of the current course:
It is 2020. Federal caseloads have quadrupled in the last 25
years, but the number of federal judges has leveled off at 1000.
tThe federal budget remains in crisis, the product of continued
growth in non-discretionary federal spending and the unwillingness
to raise taxes. Congress is no longer willing to fund the increasing
costs of new courthouses, support staff and judicial salaries
necessary to address the rising tide of cases.

76. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 13, at 17-20.
77. Limiting the growth of the federal judiciary has been a prominent and controversial
topic in recent years. Compare Stephen Reinhardt, Too FewJudges, Too Many Cases,A.B.A.J.,Jan.
1993, at 52-54 (proposing that Congress should double size of circuit courts of appeals), with
Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice,A.BA J.,July 1993, at 70-73 (responding to Judge
Reinhardt's article by highlighting problems inherent in increasing size of federal courts). In
1980, Judge Alvin Rubin forecast:
If we drift with the times and respond to only needs as they arise, we will by 1990 have
spawned a vastjudging machine. It may run smoothly. We hope so. It may be honest
and capable. We hope so. But unless some basic problems are considered and solved,
our judicial branch will become increasingly faceless and anonymous. The President
will nominate, the Senate will consent but bureaucracy will decide.
Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the Federal Courts: The Tension BetweenJustice andEfficiency, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 648, 658-59 (1980); see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, 101st Cong. 8 (1990) (noting unprecedented growth and change in federal courts
during last half century); Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates
and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989) (arguing that federal courts were created to
be small and recently have reached their natural limits of expansion); HenryJ. Reske, Keeping
a Trim FederalJudiciary,A.BAJ., Dec. 1993, at 26 (recounting recommendation of the Judicial
Conference of the United States to control judicial growth carefully). For a recent discussion
of the issue by the new Director of the Federal Judicial Center, see A. Leo Levin & Michael E.
Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1627 (1995) (articulating suggestions for
managing the federal judicial system).
78. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 18.
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Austerity is a way of life in the federal courts. The queue for civil
cases lengthens to the point where federal judges rarely conduct
civil trials. User fees proliferate and would be judged onerous by
twentieth century standards. As a consequence, many litigants seek
Overworked and underpaid
justice from private providers.
administrators defer maintenance on courthouses and no longer
update library collections. Most vacancies on the federal bench go
unfilled for long periods of time because capable lawyers, once
attracted to a judicial career, are no longer willing to serve. The
federal courts have by and large become criminal courts and courts
for those who cannot afford private justice.79
This is, and should be, a chilling prospect.
It also should not be viewed as science fiction. Already, the job of
a federal judge may be less attractive to exceptionally qualified
candidates than it once was. ° Part of the attraction of the federal
judiciary is its small size and its prestige. Another attraction is the
time and resources to do excellent work and to ensure that the results
reached are correct. Judge Anne C. Conway of the Middle District of
Florida arrived on the district court bench to find a docket of 570 civil
cases, 1070 pending motions, and a large criminal docket. She stated:
I began my tenure as a district court judge by losing sleep. In the
middle of the night, I would wake up and think of something I had
done-or not done-on a case. I thought of motions pending for
over two years. I worried about six year old cases that had not been
set for trial. I thought of all the time spent in the courtroom,
either in trial or in hearings, sentencing, status conferences, or
rearraignments, while motions continue to flow in.
After several of these middle of the night sessions, and a few
practical suggestions given to me during daylight hours, I devised
a strategy that permits me to make some headway. As often as
possible, I come in at 7:00 a.m. to clear off my desk. If I am lucky,
I am left alone to work on cases until 8:00 or 8:30. I am in trial
from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., with an extended break for lunch so
I can go through the paperwork that has accumulated during the
morning. At 4:30 p.m., I begin sentencing, rearraignments, and
pretrial conferences. Members of my staff listen to the intercom to
hear when I take a break, and they literally line up outside my door

79. Id at 20.
80. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777,
783 (1981). See generally William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Mac Swinford Lecture at The
University of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982) (transcript available from the Public Information Office,

United States Supreme Court) (forewarning that talented individuals no longer will seek
judgeships as element of prestige disappears).

1997]

CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE LONG RANGE PLAN

639

to ask questions. I sometimes feel besieged, but we are making

progress.8 '

Furthermore, the bureaucratization of the courts that the Long
Range Planprojects also is, in many respects, already upon us. Courts
rely increasingly on law clerks, staff attorneys, and masters, giving less
personal attention to their work product 2 If it is true, as Justice
Brandeis wrote, that judges are respected "because we do our own
work,""3 then the projection of the Long Range Plan already is too

much a reality.
The present imbalance between demands and resources must not
be allowed to continue. The Long Range Plan already has done a
valuable service by forcing us to contemplate where the current
conflict between Congress and the courts swiftly is taking us. Battles
over the budget, however, are not the only battles being fought
between the two branches.
II.

CONGRESS AND DIRECT REFORM OF PROCEDURE

Another source of conflict between Congress and the courts 8is4
control over procedure, particularly civil procedure, in the courts.
To appreciate why this subject is the source of such controversy today,
one must understand the history of civil rulemaking and how it has
changed in recent years.8 5

81. Anne C. Conway, First Impressions, LIG., Winter 1993, at 3, 3; see also Paul D.
Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DuKE LJ. 929, 940 (1996)
(discussing the "growing preoccupation" of district judges with administration rather than
adjudication).
82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102-19 (1985)
(discussing prominent role of law clerks in managing case loads); Harry T. Edwards, The Rising
Workload and Perceived Bureaucracyof the FederalCourts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the Searchfor
Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REv. 871, 919 (1983) (discussing how increase in number of
judges on court can impede collegiality and therefore reduce overall quality of court's work
product); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary's Bicentennial 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 428 (1989)
(stating that staff attorneys often draft opinions before judges see the briefs);Jon 0. Newman,
RestructuringFederalJurisdiction:Proposals to Preserve the FederalJudicialSystem, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
761,765 (1989) (discussing decline in quality ofjudge's work product); Linda Silberman,Judicial
Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferationof Ad Hoc Procedur4 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2131, 2132 (1974)
(discussing increased use of magistrates and masters).
83. Rubin, supra note 77, at 656.
84. A recent example of direct congressional involvement in procedure is the statutory
override of the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 19 in Martin v. Wltks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989). See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(n) (1) (A) (1994) (overruling
Supreme Court decision by disallowing collateral attacks on employment discrimination claims
after those claims have been litigated). The conflict over civil procedure also was the subject
of one session-entitled "Who Makes the Rules?"-of the Association of American Law Schools
Conference on Civil Procedure (the first in seven years) held in Washington, D.C., inJune 1995.
85. In addition to the CivilJustice Reform Act and the Common Sense Legal Reform Act,
see infraParts II.B and C respectively, Congress has taken other steps in recent years to regulate
federal procedure directly. Congress amended Rule 4 on service of process. SeePub. L. No. 97462, 96 Stat. 2527 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1983)). Congress also amended
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Backgroun& The Rules EnablingAct

Since 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated, the judiciary has been the primary source for civil rule
changes. Under the Rules Enabling Act8 6 as it operates today,
proposed rule changes are drafted not by Congress, but by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules consisting of prominent judges,
lawyers, and law professors.8 7 This committee solicits and considers
comments by the public and eventually sends its recommendations to
the Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure,
and Evidence. The Committee on Rules then forwards its recommendations to the Judicial Conference, which sends recommendations to
the Supreme Court of the United States.88 The Supreme Court then
has the power to promulgate the new rules, which become effective
after a period during which Congress has the opportunity to consider
them and to reject or modify them.89 The role of Congress for fiftytwo years after 1938 thus was reactive and, for the most part, passive.
That role changed significantly with the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990.90 Congress became even more active when the Republican
Party took control and sought to enact legislation that was part of the
91
"Contract with America."

Rule 35. SeeAnti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4401 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 1501 (1989)). Congress also attempted to reject the 1993 discovery
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SeePaul D. Carrington, Learningfrom the
Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 302-07 (1994) (outlining how
different interest groups attempted to persuade Congress to reject amendments). The conflict
over procedure may have even deeper roots, dating back to the controversy in the 1970s
regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence, and some of its most recent manifestations also
concern the evidence rules. See McCabe, supra note 10, at 1683-87 (discussing controversy over
rulemaking process surrounding enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 331, 2071-2077 (1994). For background on the passage of the Rules
Enabling Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982) (discussing how history of Act's passage can provide guidance and insight for today's
federal rulemakers); Carrington, supra note 85, at 297-99 (documenting history of passage of
Act);Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:AdjudicatoiyProcedureinDecline,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 499-515
(1986) (discussing how Act was debated and interpreted immediately prior and subsequent to
its enactment).
87. See generally McCabe, supra note 10, at 1656-75 (providing overview of rulemaking
process). For a detailed discussion of both the history and the current procedures of federal
rulemaking, see A Self Study of FederalJudidalRulemaking-A Report from the Subcommittee on Long
Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedureof the Judicial Conference of the
United States, 168 F.RID. 679 (1996).
88. See McCabe, supra note 10, at 1672-74 (detailing public comment period and Supreme
Court approval components of rulemaking process as required by 1988 amendments 'to Rules
Enabling Act).
89. See id.
90. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
91. SeeH.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposingvast changes in federal and state civiljustice
systems in accordance with "Contract with America").
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B. The CivilJustice Reform Act
1. Origins of the Act
The Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") 92 marked a radical departure from the Rules Enabling Act. Unlike most procedural changes,
the initiative for the CJRA came from Congress rather than from the
committees established by the Rules Enabling Act.93
The legislation passed over the objections of the judiciary. Senator
Joseph Biden (D-Del.), then chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, was the driving force behind the CJRA, which was dubbed
the "Biden Bill."94 He began by assembling a task force co-sponsored by the Foundation for Change and the Brookings Institute to
study and make recommendations concerning the civil justice
system.95 Senator Biden wrote that the purpose of the task force was
to bring together a diversified group to study the problems of expense
and delay in federal civil cases.96 Significantly, no sitting federal
judge was a member of the task force, although two former judges
participated.97 The task force recommended mandating that each
district adopt certain techniques and reforms and a plan describing
how the reforms would be implemented." The individual district
plans, however, were to be merely details of the implementation of
the task force's uniform design.
The initial legislation closely tracked the recommendations of the
task force.99 The bill, however, encountered immediate vociferous

92. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482.
93.

See Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges andLegislators: Enhancing the Relationship,44 Am.U. L.

REV. 1537, 1548 (1995). For general background on the evolution of the CJRA, see S. REP. No.
101-416 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802.

94. See Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST.

LJ. 279, 279 (1991).
95. For an excellent discussion of the background of the CJRA, see Terence Dunworth &
James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation of the Pilot Programof the CivilJustice

Reform Act of 1990,46 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1303-06 (1994) (discussing perceived problems with
civil justice system and government proposals for reform preceding passage of CJRA).
96. SeeJoseph R Biden, Jr., Introduction to Symposium on the CivilJustice Reform Act, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV., at i, i (1993).
97. SeeBROOKINGSINST.,JUSTICEFORAu REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY INCMLLITIGATION
1 (1989) (listing Shirley Hufstedler, former federal judge for the Ninth Circuit, and Norman
Krivosha, former ChiefJustice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, as members of task force).
98.

See id.

99. -See id. at 2-3 (recommending that Congress direct each federal district court to develop
formal plans to reform civiljustice system); see also Rand Institute for CivilJustice, Evaluating the
Civil Justice

Reform

Act

of

1990

(visited

Oct.

20,

1996)

<http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB9022/RB9022.htnl> [hereinafterRand CTRAR-ort]
(stating that recommendations of Sen. Biden's Task Force on Civil Justice Reform ultimately
were incorporated into legislation).
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opposition from the judiciary," especially the Judicial Conference
of the United States, which accused Congress of attempting to
"micromanage" the federal courts' business. The position of the
Judicial Conference was summed up by the late Judge Robert
Peckham in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
I come to bring you the position of the executive committee of
the Conference and tell you why we can't endorse the bill. First, we
have told you about the 14-point program of the Judicial Conference [an alternative reform proposal], and we feel that will have
the same effective impact that the legislation will have.
But, second, the executive committee fears that the statute would
circumvent the procedures established and recently reendorsed by
Congress in the Rules Enabling Act, and set a precedent for unwise
departures from the rulemaking process.
We feel there is a great balance in the provisions of the Rules
Enabling Act, that it took ten years in gestation from 1924 to 1934.
And as I indicated, it has been revisited and recently reendorsed.
It allows a deliberative process at the beginning. It allows comment
from judges and scholars and lawyers.'O
Despite the intensity of the opposition, Congress passed the CJRA
and the President signed it into law less than one year after it had
been introduced. By the time it passed, however, the legislation had
changed fundamentally. It did not mandate particular reforms, but
rather local study and response to the perceived problems of excessive
0 2 Nevertheless, the CJRA
cost and delay in civil litigation."
was a
radical departure from the Rules Enabling Act' 3 and involved
Congress much more directly in dictating procedure in the federal
courts.
2.

The Act's provisions
a.

The role of advisory groups

The first step under the CJRA was the creation of Advisory Groups
for each district.' 4 The judges in each district were to decide who

100. See Tacha, supra note 93, at 1541 ("TheJudicial Improvements Act [of which the QJRA
wvas one component], as introduced, contained numerous provisions relating to civil case

management and provoked significant concerns among members of judiciary. The debate
during the development of that bill often put the two branches in juxtaposed positions, even
though they shared common goals.").
101. The CivilJusticeReform Act of 1990 and theJudicialImprovements Act of 1990: Hearings on
S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. 316-17 (1990).
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 478 (1994).
103. MdL
§ 2072.
104. See id, § 478.
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would be members, subject to the restriction in the CJRA that each
Advisory Group contain representatives of the primary types of
litigants in each district.1°5 The greatest percentage of Advisory
Group members, by far, are attorneys who practice in the district." 6
The Advisory Groups' duties were to report, recommend, and explain.
The reporting function includes: (1) assessment of the district's civil
and criminal dockets, trends in case filings, and other demands on
the courts' resources; (2) identification of the principal causes of cost
and delay in the district; and (3) examination of how to reduce cost
and delay by better assessment of the impact of new legislation on the
courts. 0 7 The core of the Advisory Groups' job has been to recommend particular reforms to be adopted in each district to reduce cost
The Advisory Groups thus
and delay in light of local conditions.'
appeared to decentralize the power previously concentrated under the
Rules Enabling Act.
Cost and delay reduction principles and techniques
Despite the appearance of local autonomy, Congress gave quite
detailed instructions in § 473 of the CJRA and required the Advisory
Groups to explain how their plans complied with the Act.'0 9 Most
of § 473 is taken up with inventories of "principles and guidelines of
litigation management and cost and delay reduction."1 o Every
CJRA Advisory Group must consider these principles and techniques,
although only "pilot courts" are required to adopt them."' The
pilot courts are located in districts that were selected as sites for an
extensive study of the effectiveness of the CJRA's principles and
techniques for reducing cost and delay.
The CJRA requires that every district court must approach its plan
for cost and delay reduction with six principles in mind: (1)
systematic, differential treatment of cases of differing complexity (also
known as "tracking" cases); (2) early and ongoingjudicial involvement
in planning the progress of a case-such as by imposing limits on the
amount or time for discovery, setting an early, firm trial date, and
setting deadlines for the filing and disposition of motions; (3) close
b.

105. Id. § 478(b).
106. See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the CivilJustice
Reform Act of 1990,59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 891 (1993) (stating that most advisory groups consist
of attorneys).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c) (1) (A)-(D).
108. See id. § 472(b) (3).
109. See id. § 473.
110. Id. § 473(a).
111. See id. § 473(a), (b).

THE AMERICAN UNwmERSrIY LAW REVIEw

644

[Vol. 46:625

monitoring of complex cases, with particular attention to the
possibility of bifurcating issues for trial and conducting discovery in
stages or "phases"; (4) encouragement of cost-effective discovery
"through the use of cooperative discovery devices"; (5) prohibition of
filing motions without a certification that the parties have attempted
to resolve the dispute informally; and (6) authorization to refer cases
to alternative dispute resolution programs such as mediation,
minitrial, summary jury trial, or other programs authorized by the
district (such as court-annexed arbitration)., 2
In addition to the principles that each Advisory Group must
consider, there are six "litigation management and cost and delay
reduction techniques" that must be considered and may be included.
These techniques are: (1) ajoint discovery-case management plan to
be submitted early in the case; (2) a requirement that attomeys
attend pretrial conferences with authority to bind their clients on
designated issues for discussion (which could include a mandatory
settlement conference); (3) a requirement that the attorney and the
client sign all requests for extension of time for discovery or continuance of a trial date; (4) an evaluation program in which a nettral
court representative meets with the parties early in a case to assess the
possibilities of settlement, discovery planning, or both; (5) a requirement that parties or representatives of parties with authority to make
settlement decisions be present or available by telephone during a
settlement conference; and (6) such other techniques as appear to be
appropriate in light of the assessments made of the district's
needs."

c.

3

The contents of the plans

After the Advisory Groups completed their work, each district court
was to promulgate its delay and expense reduction plan." 4 Every
district court now has done so.' 5 Some districts chose to have their
plans in place by December 1993 and thereby qualify for additional
financial assistance in connection with their plans." 6 These "early
implementation district" plans displayed enormous variety.
For

112. See id. § 473(a).
113. See id. § 473(b).
114. See id. § 472(a), (d).
115. See Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Just, Speedy, andInexpensive? An Evaluation ofJudicial
Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (visited Mar. 9, 1997)
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR800/MR80O.html>.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note.
117. SeeAMERGAN BARASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CMLJUSTIcE REFORM AaT
2 (1992) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT); see also Rand CJRA Report; supra note 99
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example, the CJRA required each district to consider the establishment of different "tracks" of cases, each to receive a different amount
of management from the court. 8 In the early implementation and
pilot districts alone (a total of thirty-four districts), nine 'districts
rejected the idea altogether.1 9 Three established two tracks, seven
established three tracks, and the rest established between four and
seven tracks of cases. 2 ° In some districts, tracking is entrusted to
judicial discretion, and in others either it is rule-based or the
attorneys select the track.'
If one purpose of the CJRA was to
engender ninety-four "experiments," then the variety evident in the
CJRA plans indicates that the statute has been a success in this regard.
The overriding point is that the experiments are being conducted
according to a protocol dictated by Congress.'
The CJRA thus
bypassed the Rules Enabling Act and commanded reform by direct
legislation." The CJRA, however, was not the last of such legislation.
C.

The Common Sense Legal Reform Act

The "Contract with America," the platform upon which the
Republican Party ran and obtained control of both Houses of
Congress in 1994, promised further reform of the civil justice
system.1 4 These reforms originally were part of one bill, H.R. 10,
that 'was introduced early in the first session of the 104th Congress. "
With this legislation, Congress took the next significant
step toward a confrontation with the judicial branch over control of
procedure in the federal courts.

("Variation in how districts approach case management is great and has increased since the pilot
district programs went into effect. . . . These large differences between districts in case
management policies give us the opportunity to evaluate very different policies, even if the
districts that use them did not change significantly as a result of the CJRA.").
118. See 28 U.S.C. 473(a)(1).
119. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 117, at App. A-2.
120. See id.
121. See Rand CJRA Report, supra note 99 (discussing variations in how CJRA has been
implemented).
122. See id. (stating that all pilot districts adopted plans that included six principles required
by Act and that plans met CJRA requirements).
123. See28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (dictating reform of civiljustice system without altering Federal
Rules).
124. For background on the "Contract with America" and how it became embodied in
various items of legislation, see Philip D. Bostwick, CivilJusticeReform Through FederalLegislation:
Watching the House, the Senate, and the President Make Sausage in Civ. PRAC. & LmG. TECH. INTHE
FED. CTS., at 321 (AI-ABA Course Study Materials, Dec. 14-16, 1995).
125. See Weiner, supranote 12, at 1 (noting that bill was introduced on January 4, 1995).
For a general discussion and critique of the proposals in H.R. 10, see Carl Tobias, Common Sense
and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. Ruv. 699 (1995).
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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

The various procedural reforms that were part of the original
legislation implementing the "Contract with America" were incorporated into several bills for separate consideration. Only the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199512" has become law. This
Act contains a number of procedural changes applicable to the
pretrial phase of securities fraud cases.127
The Act contains a heightened pleading standard beyond the
requirement under Rule 9(b) 12 that fraud be alleged "with particularity."129 For all cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a misleading statement or a material omission, the plaintiff
must specify each statement that was misleading, why it was misleading, and, as to any such allegation made on information and belief,
a statement with particularity of all facts upon which the plaintiff's
belief is formed."3 Also, the plaintiff can recover only upon stating
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind. 3 '
The Act requires the court to stay all discovery during the pendency
of a motion to dismiss unless a party can demonstrate undue
prejudice or unless particularized discovery is necessary to preserve
evidence.'3 2 During such a stay, however, all parties must preserve
relevant evidence as if it has been requested under Rule 34. l 33
Those who willfully disobey this obligation are subject to "appropriate
sanctions."'" In addition, the Act exempts defendants from liability
for certain "forward-looking statements" and stays discovery, other
than discovery relating to the applicability of the exemption, during
the pendency of any motion for summary judgment based on the
s
exemption 135

126. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to 78u-5
(West Supp. 1996)).
127. See generaly Mary S.Deimer, Reforms ChangeLandscapeofSecuritiesLitigation LTG. NEws,
Mar. 1996, at 1, 4 (summarizing and discussing potential effects of Act).
128. FED. R. Cv. P. 9(b) (requiring that all averments of fraud or mistake state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake).
129. 15 U.S.CA. § 78u-4(b) (1) (West Supp. 1996).
130.

Seeid.

§

78u-4(b)(1).

131. Seeid. § 78u4(b)(2).
132. See id. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B). For a discussion of how the courts are interpreting this
section, see Questions About Discovery Stay Surface with PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act, FED.
DISCOVERY NEWS, May 1996, at 2.
133. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4.
134. Id. § 78u-4(b) (3) (C) (ii).
135. See id. § 78u-5(f).
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The Act requires the court in every securities fraud case to make
specific findings regarding whether the parties and attorneys have
complied with Rule 11 (b) with respect to every complaint, responsive
8 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
pleading, and dispositive motion."
11 (b) requires attorneys to make a reasonable inquiry before signing
a pleading and provides that a signature is a certification that the
pleading is not being presented for an improper purpose. 37 The
signature also certifies that the legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that the factual contentions have evidentiary support or are likely to have evidentiary support
after additional time for investigation and discovery."~ If the court
finds that Rule 11 (b) has been violated, it must impose sanctions.3 9
Those sanctions are presumed, for a complaint that violates the rule,
to be the expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in the action."4 For
a responsive pleading or dispositive motion, those sanctions are
presumed to be fees and expenses incurred as a direct result of the
violation. 4 ' The presumption can be rebutted by evidence that the
violation was de minimis (such as one count from a multi-count
complaint) or that the award of fees would be an unjust and
is rebutted, the court
unreasonable burden." If the presumption
43
is to impose "appropriate" sanctions.
In a securities fraud class action, the lead plaintiff must certify that:
(1) he or she reviewed and authorized the filing of the complaint; (2)
the plaintiff did not purchase the securities at the direction of counsel
or in order to participate in a suit; and (3) the plaintiff is willing to
serve as lead plaintiff for the class. 14 Also, the lead plaintiff has
twenty days after filing the complaint to provide notice to members
of the class in a widely circulated business publication to invite them
to volunteer to serve as lead plaintiff." The Act requires the court
to appoint the "most adequate plaintiff' and to presume that the
member of the class who has sought to represent the class and who
has the largest financial stake is the most adequate plaintiff."' The

136.

See id. § 78u-4(c) (1).

137.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).

138. See id.
139. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(c).
140. See id. § 78u-4(c) (3) (A) (ii).
141. See id. § 78u-4(c) (3) (A) (i).
142. See id. § 78u-4(c) (3) (B) (i)-(ii).
143. See id. § 78u-4(c) (3)(C).
144. See id. § 77z-1 (a) (2) (A) (i)-(iii).
145. See id. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (A) (i) (I)-(I1).
146. See id. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (B).
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presumption that the largest stakeholder will be the most adequate
plaintiff may be rebutted by a showing that the plaintiff will not
represent the class fairly and adequately or is subject to unique
defenses. 147 The lead plaintiff, as appointed by the court, will
choose lead counsel, subject to the court's review as necessary to
protect other members of the class.'4
With certain narrow exceptions, a plaintiff may recover from each
defendant only the proportion of the damage caused by that
defendant, unless that defendant committed a knowing violation of
the securities laws."
With the elimination of joint and several
liability in such cases comes an important provision to encourage
settlement: claims for contribution against a settling defendant are
barred. 5 ° In addition, settlement notices for class actions must
contain specific information.151
The notice must disclose the
aggregate amount to be paid to the class and the amount calculated
on an average per share basis." 2 The notice also must contain a
joint statement, if agreement can be reached, of the amount per
share that the plaintiff will recover if the plaintiff prevails on each
claim. 5' If the parties cannot agree, the notice must contain a
statement regarding the areas of disagreement. 5 4 The notice also
must contain an explanation of why the parties are proposing to settle
the case and a statement and explanation of any fees that are, to be
paid from the common fund. 5
These examples, which are not intended to be exhaustive, illustrate
the pervasive procedural impact that this legislation will have. In
effect, Congress has rewritten Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 11,
23, and 26 without following the more circuitous procedures of the
Rules Enabling Act. The movement that began with the CJRA has
accelerated from congressionally imposed local experimentation to
uniform statutory procedures.

147.

See id. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (II) (aa)-(bb). The plaintiffmay conduct discovery to discern

who the most adequate plaintiff is only if the plaintiff first demonstrates a reasonable basis for
finding that the party with the largest financial stake is incapable of being an adequate
representative. See id. § 77z-2(a) (3) (B) (iv). One purpose of this provision is to increase the
role of institutional investors in directing securities litigation. See H.RL CONF. REP. No. 104-369,
at 30 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 747.
148. See 15 U.S.CA § 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (v).
149. See id. § 78u-4(g) (2).
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See
See
See
See
See
See

M,. §
id. §
id §
id. §
id. §
id. §

78u-4(g) (7) (A).
77z-1(a)(7).
77z-1(a) (7) (A).
77z-1 (a) (7) (B) (i).
77z-1 (a) (7) (B) (ii).
77z-1(a) (7) (C), (E).
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The proceduralimpact of otherproposed legislation

Although the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 is the
only aspect of "Common Sense Legal Reform" that has become law,
the Republican majority in the 104th Congress attempted to make a
number of other procedural changes by direct legislation. In
particular, the Attorney Accountability Act (which passed in the
House but on which the Senate took no action) would have enacted
three procedural reforms. 156
The Attorney Accountability Act would have amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (and bypassed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68)157 to
provide for written offers of settlement not less than ten days before
trial of a diversity case. 5 ' If the offeree rejected the offer but failed
to obtain a better result by going to trial, the offeree would have been
obliged to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred
after the offer was rejected, unless the court found that requiring this
payment would be "manifestly unjust."159 For example, a plaintiff
whose offer to settle for $250,000 was rejected would have been able
to recover the post-offer fees and expenses if the final judgment
exceeded that offer. The defendant in that case who made an offer
of $100,000 would have recovered post-offer fees and expenses if the
final judgment was less than $100,000. Any final judgment between
these figures would have resulted in each party bearing its own costs
and fees, absent another basis for shifting the costs and fees to the
other party. 6°
The Attorney Accountability Act also would have amended Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.161 The Act would have made Rule 11
applicable to discovery and would have made the imposition of
sanctions for a violation of the rule mandatory 6 It would have
eliminated the "safe harbor" provision added in 1993 that requires a
Rule 11 motion to be served but not filed and gives the offending
156. See Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong.
157. Rule 68 is entitled "Offer ofJudgment" and provides for payment of costs if an offer
is rejected and the judgment obtained is not more favorable than the offer. See FED. 1R Civ. P.
68.
158. See H.R. 988 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (1)); H.R. REP. No. 104-62,
at 1 (1995).
159. See H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at 2 (1995).
160. SeeBostwick, supranote 124, at 4-5 (discussing allocation of attorney's fees and expenses
between parties).
161. For a critique of this provision, see Carl Tobias, Why CongressShould Reject Revision ofRule
11, 160 F.R.D. 275 (1995) (arguing that revision would reinstate satellite litigation and chilling
effects, problems that Rule 11 was intended to cure).
162. See H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at 18 (proposing amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11).
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party twenty-one days to withdraw the offending pleading before the
motion can be filed and sanctions can be imposed." Finally, the
amended Rule 11 would have resulted in more frequent shifting of
fees because it would have required the sanction imposed to be
sufficient not only to deter violations but also to compensate those
who had been victims of such violations."6
A final pretrial change in the Attorney Accountability Act would
have involved an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence rather
Under Daubert v.
than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.," the trial judge must undertake to

decide whether scientific testimony is scientifically valid and whether
it will assist the trier of fact in the particular case. 67 Even if the
evidence meets these criteria, the trial judge remains free to rule that
it is inadmissible if its probative value is outweighed substantially by
dangers of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.1" Such
decisions often are made at a pretrial stage when, for example, a
motion for summary judgment must be granted if the plaintiff's
scientific evidence on a crucial element of the case is inadmissible.'69 The legislation would have required the exclusion of scientific evidence unless it was found to be scientifically valid and reliable
and to have a valid connection to the fact that it is offered to
prove.17 Perhaps most significantly, the bill would have required
the probative value of the evidence to outweigh the dangers of
misleading the jury and confusing the issues, rather than the current
standard that the dangers "substantially outweigh the probative
72
value."' 7 ' Thus, the bill would have reversed the standard.
Although the Attorney Accountability Act did not become law in the
163. See id.
164. See id. at 19.
165. See id.
166. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
167. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
168. See id.
On remand,
169. See id. In fact, this was the precise posture of the Daubertdecision itself.
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment for the
defense would be appropriate because the plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony was
inadmissible. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (1995).
170. See H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at 18-19.
171. Id Reading Rule 702 in conjunction with Rule 403, the existing standard requires the
danger of misleading the jury with scientific evidence to substantially outweigh its probative value
for the evidence to be excluded. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (allowing for admission of scientific
evidence if it will assist trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue);
FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time).
172. See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Legislation-ProposedRules Amendments, COMMrrrEE ON TRIAL
EVIDENCE, Spring 1995, at 8.
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104th Congress, it is another important example of Congress' attempt
to regulate pretrial procedure directly. It is clear that Congress is
undertaking to reform procedure directly with increasing frequency
and determination. The implications of this movement, in the
context of other actions by Congress related to the federal courts, are
particularly disturbing.
D. Implications of DirectReform
Increased direct congressional regulation of procedure is making
practice in the federal courts more complex. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were intended to be uniform throughout the United
States.' 73 Geographic uniformity is gone, however, in part due to
the CJRA.' 7 With that Act, Congress required the district courts to
adopt procedures that were tailored to the individual district. The
result has been the "balkanization" of procedure. 75 The careful
practitioner now must check the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
local Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, the local rules
of court, and the standing orders of the individual judge to whom the
case is assigned.1 6 This complexity is not without its costs.
The proliferation of local differences creates what Professor Paul
Carrington has called "legal clutter":
Legal clutter is the enemy of simplicity; the more such material is
placed in the hands of parties and lawyers, the more billable hours
will be expended, but the less well-read and well-understood the
real rules will be, and the more likely that litigation will digress
from the merits to satellite controversies.

177

173. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis.
L. REv. 631, 672-73 (stating that the fundamental element of original Rules was to promulgate
uniform means for local courts to exercise control).
174. See generaUy Lauren K. Robel, FracturedProcedure" The CivilJusticeReform Act of 1990, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1994) (bemoaning Act's effects on uniformity and simplicity of
Federal practice under national procedure rules); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the
Balkanization of Civil Procedure 24 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393, 1393 (1992) (cautioning against
"balkanization" of federal procedural system).
175. SeeTobias, supranote 174, at 1393; see also Carrington, supra note 85, at 304 (noting that
there is "some risk that the CJRA will indeed result in the complete unraveling of national
procedural standards as we have known them for the last half century").
176. For an analysis of some of the issues raised by these overlapping and sometimes
contradictory sources of authority, see Edwin J. Weseley, The CivilJustice Reform Act; The Rules
EnablingAct;The Amended FederalRules ofCivil Procedure;CJRA Plans;Rule 83-What Trumps What,
154 F.RtD. 563, 577-78 (1994).
177. Carrington, supra note 81, at 947-48 (citingJOHN P. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE
FOR RADICAL REFORM 86-90 (1969)); see also Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting 3 (June 23-24, 1994), availablein 1994 WL 880354 ("Several
of the members stated that the CivilJustice Reform Act had caused procedural uncertainty and
confusion in the district courts. The bar was expressing concern that it is difficult to determine
precisely what procedures are in effect in a given district in light of the CJRA experimentation
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If Congress passes general legislation like the Attorney Accountability
Act, 178 practitioners will have to consult additional provisions of title
28 of the U.S. Code as well. 9
With the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,80
Congress introduced a new type of complexity: different procedural
rules for different types of cases. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended not only to be geographically uniform but also
"trans-substantive" (the same rules apply to all civil actions).181 Now,
however, Rule 11 means one thing for securities cases and something
else for other cases. Likewise, Rule 23 means one thing for securities
cases and something else for other types of class actions. The
standard for pleading a securities case no longer can be found in
Rules 8 or 9, but rather is embodied in a separate statute.18 2 The
Federal Rules govern only sometimes. If this Act is the first of many
of its type, a Congress that began with the intent of simplifying legal
processes may have made them exponentially more complex.
An especially troubling aspect of direct reform of procedure-such
as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-is the
politicization of the rulemaking process. The primary proponents of
the legislation intended notjust to improve securities litigation but to
bury it, or at least to limit it."8 The underlying concerns were not
procedural at all, but rather substantive and political: what should
the standards of liability for securities fraud be and who should
enforce them? To the extent that this statute foretells the piecemeal
politicization of procedural rulemaking, it bodes ill for a national,
uniform system of procedure."8
Congress and the courts are battling for control of procedure in
federal courts. In recent years, Congress has asserted a more direct
role in establishing that procedure, which has led to increased

178. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995).
179. Presumably, future statutory changes to federal procedure would be codified in title 28
of the U.S. Code.
180. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.CA §§ 77a to 78u-5

(West Supp. 1996)).
181. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2078
(1989); see also FED. R Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
").
courts in all suits of a civil nature ..

182. See 15 U.S.CA §§ 77a to 78u-5 (requiring that securities pleadings contain even greater
specificity than is required under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
183. For example, Title I of the Act is entitled "Reduction of Abusive Litigation." SeePub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
184. See Carrington, supra note 85, at 310 ("If the Civil Rules are to become the plaything
of factional politics of the sort ordinarily prevailing on the Hill, the quality of our adjective [sic)
law must diminish as one group after another gains a special advantage for itself.").
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complexity and disuniformity. Considered in conjunction with the
budgetary disputes already described, these procedural battles are
significant, further illustrations of the deteriorating relationship
between Congress and the courts.
III.

REFORMING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS

The present relationship between Congress and the courts has had
ill effects on the federal court system and must be reformed. The
Long Range Plan rejects confrontation with Congress and instead
contains numerous proposals that require congressional action or
forbearance."
It does not go far enough, however, toward solving
the problems of recurrent budget battles or conflicts over procedure.
Part III sets forth how the Long Range Plan proposes to address these
issues and suggests some further steps.
A.

The Overall Approach: Conciliation,Not Confrontation,
with Congress
Before discussing how the Planaddresses the questions of resources
and procedural reform, and before any critique of the particulars of
the Plan is undertaken, it bears noting that the Plan rejects confronting Congress with an assertion of inherent judicial power over these
issues.'
There is precedent for such an assertion with respect to
both resources and procedure, but the approach of the Plan to seek
87
accommodation with Congress was the prudent course."
Numerous state courts have confronted legislative bodies and
sought to compel adequate funding of judicial operations. For
example, in 1970, the judges of the Court of Common Pleas in
Philadelphia filed suit to force the mayor and the City Council of
Philadelphia to appropriate additional money."
The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held:
[T]he judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and
185. See Sarah Evans Barker, FederalCourt Long Range Planning- Fine Lines and Tightropes, 71
IND. LJ. 859, 864 (1996) ("Many, if not most, of the important recommendations throughout
the Plan, in order to become general public policy, will require either positive legislation or
forbearance from legislation that already has been or soon could be offered as a bill in
Congress."); see also Editorial, A New Approach to Long-Range Planningfor the Federal Courts, 79
JUDICATURE 4, 4-5 (1995) (criticizing the Plan's concentration on legislative matters).
186. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 13, at 2 ("Congress sets the courts' budgets and the
scope of federal jurisdiction ....

").

187. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971) (holding that as co-equal
branch of government, courts must be funded adequately to avoid "any impairment").
188. See id.
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necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers
and duties to administer justice, if it is to be in reality a co-equal,
independent branch of our government.L9
With only a few exceptions, courts that have faced the issue have held
that the courts do possess inherent power to compel legislatures to
fund the judiciary adequately. 190 In a recent example, the former
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Sol Wachtler, sued
Governor Mario Cuomo on behalf of the judiciary.'
The legal
grounds for a confrontation with Congress over its refusal to
appropriate the funds made necessary by its jurisdictional legislation
are present, if the federal courts choose to assert them. The Long
Range Plan pointedly notes the existence of the legal precedent but
just as clearly disclaims any interest in using it:
Separation of powers principles require that no branch of
government deprive another of either the power or the resources
it needs to perform its core functions. Discharge of the judicial
function as an independent branch requires resources sufficient for
the judiciary to perform all its constitutional and statutory mandates. Unlike several state judiciaries, which have asserted an
inherent right to compel funding beyond the regular appropriations for judicial functions, federal courts depend upon the
Congress to provide them with sufficient resources. Chronic failure
to provide adequate resources puts federal judges in the unfortunate position
of supplicants, constantly begging the Congress for
1 92
funds.
The judiciary has chosen, for now, not to confront Congress over
the budget, but rather to convince Congress to balance the demands
it places on the courts with the resources it provides.
Inherent power also is a potential source of authority for the courts
to resist the direct imposition by Congress of procedural reforms such
as the CJRA and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 93
Professor Linda Mullenix has argued forcefully that the CJRA is
unconstitutional precisely because it interferes with the inherent
power of the courts over procedure." The argument that Congress

189. Id.
190. See generally Note, The Courts' Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding of Judicial
Functions, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1687, 1688 n.8 (1983) (citing cases that have found that courts have
inherent authority to compel appropriations).
191. See generally Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits ofInherent Power, 14 PACE
L. REv. 111 (1994); Walter E. Swearingen, Note, Wachtier v. Cuomo: Does New York'sJudiciaq
Have an Inherent Right of Self-Preservation?,14 PACE L. REV. 153 (1994).
192. LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 13, at 94.
193. See supra Part II.
194. See Linda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separationof Powers,77 MiNN. L. REv. 1283, 1293 (1993) (articulating that federal courts are not
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violates the separation of powers when it directly legislates procedure
is an old one. 95 Most recent scholars have concluded, however,
that Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate procedure
in the federal courts. 9 6 Although there is no question that the
courts have some inherent power to control some procedures, 9 7 the
Long Range Plan nowhere supports its use to resist direct reform of
procedure. Its implicit assumption is that direct reform by Congress
of procedural rules is unwise but not unconstitutional.'

bound to follow another branch's interpretation of constitution).
195. SeeJohn H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules forJudicialProcedureAre Void Constitutionally,
23 U. ILL. L. REv. 276, 277-79 (1928) (arguing that courts must determine own procedural rules
and stating that when legislative bodies determine judicial procedures, such rules are void
constitutionally).
196. See, eg., S. REP. No. 101-46, at 9-12 (1990);JeffreyJ. Peck, "Users United": The CivilJustice
Reform Act of 1990,54 LIAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105,114 (1991); Martin H. Redish, FederalJudicial
Independence; Constitutionaland PoliticalPerspectives, 46 MERCER L. REv. 697, 699 (1995).
197. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Inherent power
has been frequently invoked by the courts to regulate the conduct of the members of the bar
as well as to provide tools for docket management."); Felix F. Stumpf, INHERENT POWERS OF THE
COURTS 1 (1994) ("The judiciary's inherent powers have been often exercised in a wide variety
of situations, such as regulating members of the bar, utilizing contempt powers, enforcing
decrees, promulgating court rules, and mandating increased expenditure for courts. Despite
its extensive exercise, learned writers have described the concept as 'shadowy' and 'nebulous.'");
Daniel.. Meador, InherentJudiialAuthorityin the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1805,
1806 (1995) ("Inherent authority is well established and widely accepted in the state and federal
judiciaries....").
For a discussion of particular inherent procedural powers, see Hugh Macy Favor, Jr., Note,
FederalCourts SanctioningRepresentedParties Using Rule 11 and TheirInherent Power. You Can Run
But You Cannot Hide,21 CAP. U. L. REV. 225, 226-27 (1992). For cases discussing these powers,
see Kokkonen v. GuardianLife Insurance. Co., 114 S. Ct 1673, 1676-77 (1994) (defining authority
to enforce settlement agreements); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (giving courts
power to sanction bad faith conduct in litigation); Roadway Express v. Piper,447 U.S. 752, 757-68
(1980) (discussing assessment of attorneys' fees); Link v. Wabash RailroadCo., 370 U.S. 626, 63233 (1962) (allowing courts to exercise their power to dismiss for want of prosecution); Gulf Oil
v. Gilbert 330 U.S. 501, 509-12 (1947) (dismissing for forum non conveniens); Landis v. North
American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (finding that court has inherent power, if public interest
is great enough, to stay one case while awaiting outcome of other case or cases); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266-69 (10th Cir. 1995) (imposing sanctions to promote efficiency,
to regulate the docket, and to deter frivolous filings); In reAir Crash Disasterat FloridaEverglades,
549 F.2d 1006, 1020 (5th Cir. 1977) (awarding lead counsel fees); and Carrollv. Jaques, 926 F.
Supp. 1282, 1286-87 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (sanctioning attorney for misconduct at deposition,
including calling opposing attorney an "idiot" and a "slimy son-of-a-bitch"). For additional
materials on this issue, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION THIRD § 21.5 (1995) (describing
inherent power to appoint experts to assist court, such as "technical advisors");John Gibeaut,
Mood-Alterng Verdict: JudgeSuspects ProzacSettlement Though Case Went tojuiy, A.BAJ., Aug. 1996,
at 18, 18 (granting power to conduct investigation to determine whether parties secretly had
settled case before it was sent to jury); LeroyJ. Torquist, The Active Judge in PretrialSettlement:
InherentAuthority GoneAwry, 25 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 743,753 (1989) ("Implicit in this discussion
is the suggestion that ajudge cannot occupy both the role of mediator and the role ofjudge-as
a matter of structure.").
198. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 58-59 (arguing that although Congress may
have constitutional power to enact procedural rules for courts, this power may be unwise to use
because it creates numerous extra burdens for judiciary in adjudicating disputes).
.
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Inherent power, whatever its contours, thus, was rejected by the
drafters of the Long Range Planas a solution for the federal courts for
its current problems with Congress. With respect to funding, it is
evident why the better part of valor is not to "compel" additional
funds: the courts have no divisions upon which to call if Congress
The courts could summon appropriations, so could
refuses."9
anyone, but would they come?"° Almost certainly not. Similarly,
the courts could refuse to enforce procedural changes from Congress
if they want to assert the inherent power to do so. But if the judiciary
chose to precipitate a constitutional crisis with Congress, the judiciary
would antagonize the institution that has the power of the purse. The
judiciary's budget probably would suffer even more severe shortfalls
as a result than it does already. Inherentjudicial power is a fascinating academic concept, but perhaps it is best that its outer limits
remain unknown. °t Conciliation is the better part of valor, and the
Long Range Plan wisely chooses this course. The only question is
precisely what form this conciliation should take.
B.

Resources

The Long Range Plan contains a chapter devoted to providing
sufficient resources for the federal court system. 0 2 That chapter
begins with the obvious proposition that the courts should receive the
resources they need to do their job well. 2 3 The Plan contains three
specific proposals of immediate relevance: (1) making some budget
items non-discretionary; (2) coordinating funding with jurisdictional
changes; and (3) future reliance primarily on general appropriations
rather than user fees. ° '
1.

The creation of mandatory accounts

The Long RangePlanrecommends that Congress include appropriations for the courts to discharge their constitutionally mandated

199. See Carrington, supra note 85, at 310 ("[T]he Article IIIjudiciary has no more divisions
than the Pope to engage in battle on Capitol Hill.").
200. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRSr PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 3, sc. 1
("Glendower. I can call spirits from the vasty deep. Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for them?").
201. Professor Paul Carrington, after an extensive analysis of the roles of Congress and the
courts with respect to procedure, recently wrote: "We do not know whether there is a fixed limit
to the power of Congress over the federal courts, and we ought hope never to find out."

Carrington, supra note 81, at 971.
202.
203.

See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 93-110.
See id. at 93.

204. See id at 94-95.
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functions as part of the "non-discretionary" federal budget. 20 5
Technically, this proposal is to make payment of such expenses a
"mandatory account" under the revised Budget Act,20 6 that is, one
that must be funded fully. This proposal arises primarily from the
recent problems with funds for juror fees and public defender

services. 0 7

Payment of juror fees already are, in effect, non-

discretionary because litigants have a constitutional right to a jury
trial, and by statute, jurors must be paid. 08 Congress can and
should designate these accounts as mandatory accounts and thereby
remove them from the yearly budget debates. Efforts to include juror
fees209in the list of mandatory accounts, however, have failed thus
far.
Another approach to this problem would be to exempt expenditures such as juror fees from the Antideficiency Act.210 The Act
provides that an officer or employee of the United States may not
"make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an
amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or
obligation." 211 An exemption could be fashioned for expenditures
related to the provision ofjudicial services that are mandated by the
Constitution, such as jurors in cases covered by the Seventh Amendment or the costs of defenders for criminal defendants under the
Sixth Amendment. 212 Although these proposals, either for the
creation of additional mandatory accounts under the Budget
Enforcement Act?"8 or for amendments to the Antideficiency Act,
appear to be technical, they could be significant in light of recent
205. See id. at 95.
206. See Hollings Discuse Appropriations Work, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1994, at 1, 10
(predicting possibility of shifting juror fee accounts, compensation of court appointed lawyers'
accounts, and salary accounts of U.S. Court of Federal Claims, bankruptcy and magistratejudges
to mandatory status).
207. Seegenerally28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1994) (payingjurors only $40-per-day); Longan supranote
6, at 915 (arguing that not enough money is provided to pay jurors); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: UnderfundedIndigent Defense Services andArbitraryDeathSentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 431
n.481 (1995) (arguing that not enough money is provided to defend indigent clients resulting
in overwhelming "economic disincentives for the lawyer to invest the time and the resources
necessary to develop the client's case").
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (providing for $40-per-day payment of juror fees).
209. See S. REP. NO. 103-19, at 34-35 (1993) (proposing to make juror fees mandatory
account).
210. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). See generallyLevin H. Campbell, Memorandum toJudge William
G. Young Re: Budget Committee Recommendationsfor the Federal CourtsStudy Committee, 2 FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITrEE REPORTS (1990) (arguing that
certain costs associated with federal court operations including juror fees, should be exempt
form Antideficiency Act when constitutional mandate must be met).
211. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1) (A).
212. See Campbell, supra note 210, at 3 (raising question of whether "user fees" should be
assessed from those able to afford such costs).
213. 2 U.S.C.A. § 900-904 (West Supp. 1996).
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history with Congress. The Long Range Plan provides an important
service by giving the issue the visibility it deserves. There are,
however, larger issues with respect to which the Plan falls short or is
misdirected.
2.

Coordinationof resources andjurisdiction
a. The Plan: EncouragingCongress to behave

As already shown, the primary resource problem for the federal
courts has been that Congress has not coordinated federal jurisdiction
with appropriations. 214 Recommendation 55 of the Long Range Plan
provides that Congress should appropriate the money necessary to
handle the consequences of new legislation. 2 5 The Federal Courts
Study Committee recommended six years ago that an agency be
established to advise Congress of the fiscal impact of proposed
legislation.216 In response, the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts created the Judicial Impact Office. 2 ' There is at least one
indication that Congress may be better able and willing now to
coordinate its demands with its support. The final version of the 1994
crime bill, 1 8 unlike some of the earlier versions, contained authorization for an appropriation of $200 million over five years to help the
courts manage their expanded workloads.1 9 The Long Range Plan
encourages Congress to appropriate funds to pay for new legislation.220 Such coordination must become the rule, rather than the
exception, if the courts are to operate smoothly. But there is a more
definite solution.
b. Beyond the Plan: Unfunded mandate reformfor the courts
If the fundamental problem with the judiciary's budget has been
the failure to coordinate the demands placed on the judiciary with

214. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 94 ("Congress should be urged to reduce the
Judiciary's existing obligations sufficiently to offset the impact of any new legislation with a
quantifiable judicial impact.").
215. See id.
216. SeeREPORT OFTHE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, 101st Cong. 89-90 (1990). This
idea dates to as early as 1980. See Rubin, supra note 77, at 658-59.
217. See JudicialImpact Office Takes Message to Congress, THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1991, at 1.
For an example of the work of the Judicial Impact Office, see JUDICIAL IMPACT OFFICE,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VIOLENT
CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT Acr OF 1994 (1995).

218. Violent Crime Control and Law EnforcementAct of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1795 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
219. One provision, for example, provides the judiciary with extra funding to handle cases
involving violence against women. See 42 U.S.CA. § 14002 (West Supp. 1996).
220.

See LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 13, at 94.
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the resources provided, then the proposals of the Long Range Plando
not go far enough. It also would be helpful to exhort Congress not
to impose unfunded mandates on the federal courts. Tracking the
judicial impact of proposed legislation and reporting that impact to
Congress would constitute another positive approach. A further step,
one that has been discussed in connection with the work of the
Federal Courts' Study Committee, would be to create law review
commissions with the task of identifying legislation that is having or
will have fiscal consequences and recommending corrective action.22 ' Better than any of these steps, however, would be to seek
legislation that would bind Congress not to expand the jurisdiction of
the federal courts without simultaneously authorizing the necessary
resources or reducing the jurisdiction of the courts in other respects.
In the spirit of the Rules Enabling Act,22 Congress can and should
respect the independence of the judicial branch and should commit
itself to coordination of demands and resources.
Congress is familiar with the problem of unfunded mandates. Part
of the "Contract with America" was a commitment to pass legislation
to stop the common practice of imposing expensive requirements on
states and local governments without providing any resources to help
these governments comply with them.2" Even before the "Contract
with America," state and local officials descended on Washington and
declared October 27, 1993, to be "National Unfunded Mandates
Day. '224 Some of these officials testified at congressional hearings
about the effects federal mandates were having on their ability to
fund other needs of their citizens and their ability to keep taxes at a
reasonable level.2 ' The refrain has a familiar ring to those who
decry the imposition of additional jurisdiction on the federal courts
without additional resources: It is politically expedient but ultimately

221. See Campbell, supra note 210, at 2 (arguing that because legislation is being passed
without assessing economic impact on judiciary, commission may need to be established that
could recommend need for corrective action when costs have become or will become overly
burdensome to functions ofjudiciary).
222. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994).
223. SeeUnfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.CA § 1501 (West Supp. 1996). For
a general but politicized discussion of the background of the issue, see NEWT GINGRICH, To
RENEv AMERICA 128, 229-33 (1995) (articulating view that many states and localities resent
federal laws that require states to pay for what was required federally without providing any
economic assistance).
224. See S. REP. No. 104-1, at 2 (1995).
225. See id. at 2-3. For example, Mayor Rendell of Philadelphia testified. "IW]hen you pass
a mandate down to us and we have to pay for it, the police force goes down, the firefighting
force goes down. Recreation departments are in disrepair. Our rec centers are in disrepair
because our capital budget is being sopped up by federal mandates, by the need to pay for
federal mandates." I& at 3.
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irresponsible for Congress to require other governments (or branches) to fulfill obligations without providing the resources to meet them.
Congress responded to these complaints by passing the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995.26 This Act requires the Congressional Budget Office to prepare and distribute reports to accompany any
legislation that imposes federal mandates. 227 Most importantly, the
Act provides that a point of order lies against any legislation that
imposes federal mandates above a certain amount (and with some
exceptions), yet does not provide the funds to pay for the mandates.228 In effect, when Congress passed the Act it constrained
itself either to fund its mandates or to accept that its mandates will be
ineffective. 229 The Act thus requires Congress to coordinate the demands it places on other governments (or branches) with resources
to fulfill them.2 °
Similar legislation could protect the federal courts from the
unfunded jurisdictional mandates that have created so much trouble
in recent years. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts already
prepares estimates of the costs of legislation affecting the courts.23
It is but another step, albeit a huge one, for Congress to bind itself
not to impose unfunded mandates on the courts. Any new obligations on the judicial branch would require either additional appropriations or commensurate steps to reduce the existing demands on the
courts. 3 2 Congress either could appropriate the money to pay for
these obligations, or it could totally or partially offset the costs by, for
example, raising the jurisdictional amount for diversity cases. 23" The
226. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48.
227. See 2 U.S.CA § 658c.
228. See id. § 658d. A point of order is a parliamentary objection that the matter would
violate the rules of the assembly. See THE ScorT, FoRESMAN ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER 212-15
(1981).
229. SeeS. REP. NO. 104-1, at 30-31. Senators Levin and Lieberman represented the minority
view on funding of Congress and mandates: "S. 1, however, takes a CBO estimate of the cost
of legislation to state, local and tribal governments (an estimate that CBO states may be
impossible to obtain in a number of cases) and says that if we don't appropriate money at the
level of the CBO estimate then the legislation that we passed requiring radon abatement or an
increase in the minimuri wage or tougher sewage treatment standards or reductions in dioxin,
will be ineffective." Id.

230. See2 U.S.CA. § 1501(2).
231. See, eg., Cuba Legislation Impacts Federal Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 1996, at 9
(discussing costs courts may incur associated with newly-passed Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act).
232. Opening the federal courts for claims against companies that sell property confiscated
by Cuba, for example, will impose new burdens on the courts. See id. (discussing effects of
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act on courts in terms of new costs that will have to
be incurred).
233. See New Courts Improvement Bill Introduced in Senate, THE THIRD BRANCH,July 1996, at 3
(discussing S. 1887, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, which raised the jurisdictional
amount for diversity cases to $75,000).
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Long Range Plan calls on Congress not to impose unfunded mandates.2" A response to that call, in the form of legislation, however,
would be more comforting.

3.

Userfees

With respect to coordination of demands and resources, therefore,
the Long Range Plan does not go far enough. In another respect, the
Plan takes the wrong direction. The Long Range Plan recommends
that the federal courts should rely primarily on general appropriations
rather than raise the money in the form of "user fees" from litigants.2 35 The reasons given for this recommendation are: (1) the
unpredictability of court fees from year to year; (2) the necessity of
changing fees from time to time; and (3) the fear that low and
moderate income litigants will be barred from federal courts.2 36
The Plan also recognizes that litigants create valuable precedent for
guidance of other potential litigants and thus create external
benefits. 2 7 The Long Range Plan, however, does not seek the
elimination of all fees. Instead, it adopts the position that filing fees
that are "reasonable," and from which indigent litigants are exempted, are appropriate. 2 ' s The Plan also supports other fees for
"services above a basic level"-as long as: (1) the amount is adjusted
periodically to account for inflation; (2) the administrative burden of
the fees does not outweigh its benefit; and (3) thejudiciary may keep
the money. 39
The Plan's recommendation not to encourage more user fees is
noble but ultimately misguided. This point has both a practical and
a theoretical justification. The practical point is that Congress
systematically has underfunded the courts, and the judiciary should
be aggressive in promoting sources of revenue outside the yearly
control of Congress. For similar reasons, many states rely to some
extent on user fees. 2'
The recent budget battles alone provide
sufficient reason to look beyond the budget process for sources of
revenue. 24 1 Fee income is, after all, what kept the federal courts

234. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 94.
235. See id. at 95.
236. See id. at 96.
237. See id. at 116-17.
238. See id. at 117.
239. See id. at 117-18.
240. See generally A CALL To A1-ON, supranote 16 (discussing how states have coped with
underfunding of judiciary from general appropiations).
241. See generaUy Morton M. Kondraeke, DoresNew Task. Raly Hill GOP, Outfox Clinton, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 14,1996, at 8 ("oHeill Republicans feel whipped by President Clinton in 1995 budget
wars.").
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operating during the second budget impasse. 242 Brutal practicality
should lead the judiciary to support appropriate user fees.
A theoretical justification for increased use of fees exists, as well.
Private litigants who use the federal courts to resolve their disputes
are using public resources that their filing fees do not cover. The
tendency is to use too much of a good that is priced below its real
cost 2 43 An artificially low price for a good in a free market would
cause the price to rise (thereby eliminating some demand) and the
supply to increase (thereby satisfying some demand). This process
would continue until the market cleared. When prices cannot clear
the market, something else will. For example, those who demand the
good will to have to spend extra time looking for, or awaiting delivery
of, the scarce good, or they will have to find substitutes. 24' Federal
court caseloads are at an all-time high. 245 The delays that result
have caused some litigants to choose private judging, at a higher outof-pocket cost, rather than wait in line for less expensive public
justice.2 46 Demand for federal judicial services thus has a least two
characteristics of an underpriced good: the search for substitutes and
delay in delivery. To be sure, the point must not be overstated.
Without question, the government should subsidize litigation to some
extent because private litigants create precedent that enables other
litigants to resolve or avoid disputes; thus, that precedent has public
value. 247 Furthermore, indigent litigants should not be, and constitutionally could not be, denied access to the courts because of their
inability to pay filing or other fees. 243 But to say that some subsidy

is appropriate is not to say that the nominal filing fees required today

242. See, e.g., Fees Fuel Courts; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 8, 1996,
at A12 (describing howJudicial Conference of United States decided to operate on fee income
during second budgetary impasse); John Flynn Rooney, Feesfor Federal Filings Increased $30,
JurisdictionalLimit Raised, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 25, 1996, at 1 (discussing importance of fee
income in maintaining operations of U.S. courts).
243. For a discussion of pricing ofjudicial services and the effect of a lower than "market"
price, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMC ANALYSiS OF LAW 455-56 (2d ed. 1977).
244. For a more thorough discussion of economic theory and the supply and demand of
judicial services, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 578-82 (4th ed. 1992).
245. See Record-setting Workloads Confront FederalCourts, THE THIRD BRANCH, July 1996, at 2.
246. See generally Helen I. Bendix & Richard Chemick, Renting the Judge, 21 LrrG. 33, 33
(1994) ("Some litigants submit their disputes to private judges to evade our congested court
dockets and escalating costs of litigation. Others want confidentiality, more flexible discovery
rules or what some have labeled 'designer justice'; tailored to fit the complexities of a specific
case.").
247. For a discussion of the public benefits of private adjudication, see Patrick E. Longan,
The Shot Clock Comes to TriaL Time Limits for FederalCivil Tials, 35 ARIz. L. RE v. 663, 689-691
(1993).
248. SeeBoddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380 (1971) (finding that filing fees for divorce
actions violated Due Process Clause).
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are optimal.249 Indigent litigants already have the right to petition
for waiver of fees.2 5 Increased use of filing fees thus is justified not
only by practical necessity but also by economic theory.2 5'
I have written in more detail elsewhere regarding one example of
2
such a new user fee: a fee for demanding a jury in a civil case.
Many states already impose such a fee, in amounts that range from
ten to five hundred dollars. A jury demand places significant direct
burdens on the judicial branch by requiring the payment of jurors
and adds indirect costs such as the extended length of time necessary
to conduct a jury trial.255 Civil jury trials take, on average, twice as
long as bench trials. Parties who demand ajury presently bear none
of these costs. If the fee is assessed at the time of the jury demand
and is non-refundable, it could be set low enough (perhaps around
$500) to fund at least the direct costs ofjury trials. As long as the fee
is waived for indigent litigants and is not exorbitant, it would be
constitutional and would provide at least some assistance with the
budget. It is simply a regrettable but necessary fact that Congress and
the judiciary should consider this and other user fees as part of the
plan for a solvent future.
The Long Range Plan thus addresses the question of resources in a
helpful but ultimately timid manner. In particular, legislation that
would preclude Congress from imposing unfunded mandates on the
courts and that would enable the courts to raise significant additional
revenue from filing or other fees would improve significantly the
prospects for a better balance between the demands placed on the
federal courts and the resources that will be available.
C. Procedures
The Long Range Planhas a simpler approach to the issue of direct
congressional reform of procedure: it should not happen. Implementation Strategy 28 (a) states that all proposed rule changes should
follow the procedures of the Rules Enabling Act.254 The Plan
proposes to co-opt some of the players who have turned to the
legislature for relief by proposing that the rulemaking process reach

249. Under new legislation, filing fees would increase, but only by $30. SeeS. 1887, 104th
Cong. (1996).
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
251. See Longan, supra note 6, at 912 (arguing that jury fees "will solve the problem of
fuhdingjuries without imposing an undue burden on the right to ajury trial").
252. See i&L
at 920-22 (arguing that jury fees should be assessed to raise capital for judiciary).
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 171 (providing for juror fees in federal litigation).
254. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 13, at 58.
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25 5
out to the public, the bar, and the state and federal benches.
Among the particular proposals are ones to increase the membership
of lawyers on rules committees, to expand the distribution of
publications relating to the rules, and to appoint coordinators from
state bar associations to rule committees. 6 The Long Range Plan
thus makes a persuasive case for Congress to stop meddling directly
with procedural rules. It proposes nothing other than this persuasion,
however, to accomplish this goal.
If the purpose of this implementation strategy is to show how
sensitive the rulemaking process can be to the exigencies of congressional politics, the courts need only have pointed to recent history.
Repeatedly, the minutes of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure reflect discussion of, and action based upon,
the expected actions of Congress.25 7 In another example of political
sensitivity, the courts responded to the initial push for the CJRA with
a plan of their own. 2"
The CJRA 59 and later portions of the
Common Sense Legal Reform Act?' nevertheless were imposed
upon the courts. Sensitivity alone will not suffice. It is dangerous for
the Plan to rely solely on persuading Congress to follow the Rules
Enabling Act. What is needed is to induce Congress to take legislative
steps to minimize the harm it has caused by its efforts to reform civil
procedure directly. In particular, Congress should amend the CJRA
to include a more meaningful "sunset" provision, 261 and it should

255. See id.
256. See id at 59.
257. See generally Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting
(Dec. 17-19, 1992), availablein 1992 WL 739926. "Judge Pointer stated that the primary impetus
for amending evidence rule 412 was essentially to forestall action by the Congress and to avoid
a bypass of the Rules Enabling Act process." Id. at 7. "Judge Keeton observed that the rules
process had become more 'political' than in the past, as more individuals and organizations had
become interested in the outcome of rules amendments. Accordingly, the rules committees
needed to be more alert to the political process." Id. at 16; see also Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting 5 (Jan. 11-15, 1995), available in 1995 WL
811896 ("The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules was looking at the legislation [implementing
the 'Contract with America'], but only with regard to their impact on procedural issues.");
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supranote 177, at 26 ("Judge Higginbotham
reported that legislative consideration of Rule 26(c) and protective order was continuing.");
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting 8 (Jan. 12-14, 1994),
available in 1994 WL 880350 ("Dean Cooper stated his concern that the Congress at times
bypasses the rulemaking process and enacts rules by statute. He argued that the committees
must be able to respond to political needs and prepare quality amendments to the rules in a
reasonably prompt fashion.").
258. For a discussion of the judiciary's "14-point plan," see S.REP. No. 101-650, at 30-32
(1990).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 471-482 (1994).
260. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995).
261. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-478; infra note 268 (discussing purpose behind § 103(b) (2) of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 and legislative history describing sunset provision's purpose
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bind itself for future legislation at least to refer proposed rule changes
to some or all of the Rules Enabling Act process.
1.

Sunset on the CivilJusticeReform Act
The CJRA has complicated federal practice by forcing each district
to adopt its own plan for reduction of expense and delay.262 Those
complications, which are costly, may have some value as experiments
to see what innovations may be appropriate for inclusion in amendments to the national rules. The CJRA envisions such a role for the
plans. The statute requires the Judicial Conference to report to
Congress on the effectiveness of the case management techniques and
guidelines implemented under the Act.2"
The report of the
Judicial Conference also is required to recommend whether the six
techniques and guidelines should be mandated for some or all district
courts2" and, if so, to initiate proceedings to amend the rules under
the Rules Enabling Act.2"
If the report recommends against
adoption of the techniques and guidelines, the Conference is
required to identify alternatives and is permitted to submit them to
the Rules Enabling Act process.2" The district courts eventually are
permitted to cease operating under their CJRA plans.267
The deleterious effects of the CJRA thus wither away, and the Act
even may leave a legacy of desirable, national rule changes. But the
"sunset" provision of the CJRA is not strong enough. It merely permits
each district to cease operating under its plan.2 s It should be
amended to require the cessation of local, "balkanizing" experiments
when the time for experimentation is over. Localjudges and lawyers
who drafted the plans may have substantial stakes in their continued
operation. Yet to permit so many flowers to continue to bloom will
mar what should be the uniform landscape of federal civil procedure.
as contained within § 471-78 of the Civil Justice Reform Act).
262. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-478 (describing seven year "sunset" provision that courts must
follow).
263. SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 105(c) (1), 2,8 U.S.C. § 471 note.
264. See id.§ 105(c)(2)(A).
265. See i. § 105(c)(2)(B).
266. See id. § 105(c)(2)(C).
267. See i. § 103(b) (2). The reportofthe SenateJudiciary Committee explains the purpose
of this section:
Subsection (b) (2) subjects section 471 through 478 of the CivilJustice Reform Act to
a seven-year sunset provision so that those sections can be thoroughly tested. Upon
the expiration of the seven-year period following enactment, Federal district courts are
no longer required to operate pursuant to the civiljustice expense and delay reduction
plans mandated by Title I.Congress and the courts then will have a chance to evaluate
those provisions and, if warranted, reauthorize them.
S. REP. No. 101-46, at 63 (1990).
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 471.
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Congress should require each district to cease using its individualized
plan once the national implications of the experiments are clear.
2.

Referral of rule changes to Rules EnablingAct process

Legislation to require one or more of the committees established
under the Rules Enabling Act to review any proposed rule change
before they can be put into effect by direct legislation also would be
helpful." 9 This proposal would be particularly beneficial with
respect to legislation such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, in which Congress responded to political pressure of repeat
litigants who sought tactical advantages by changing the applicable
procedural rules.27 Unlike those who lobbied for the 1995 reforms,
the judges who serve on the advisory committees are insulated from
politics.271 Congress, of course, would retain the right to override
the result of the Rules Enabling Act process, but at least when it did
so, Congress would have the benefit of the process. Further time may
have purified the politicized air that drove the reforms initially.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995272 provides a model
for such legislation. Under that statute, legislation that imposes
federal mandates is subject to a point of order until the Congressional
Budget Office has analyzed and commented on the expenses that it
More effective legislation would subject any bill that
will impose.
effects changes in rules of procedure (or presumably rules of
evidence) to a point of order unless accompanied by commentary
from the Judicial Conference or a designated rules committee.
Regardless of the details, information and time should work to the
advantage of the process. In the best case, the Rules Enabling Act
process would allow time to respond and to generate an appropriate
rule change within the process, rather than through the independent
legislation that precipitated the review.
There is precedent for this hope. Legislation to change Rule 26(c)
was introduced in response to concerns that protective orders,
particularly in products liability cases, were suppressing information
269. The idea for this legislation comes from David C. Weiner, recently the Chair of the
Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association. See Weiner, supra note 12, at 68 ("Such
a review would enable Congress to obtain the views of the impartial Rules Committee members,
who have the ongoingjob of considering the rules and obtaining evidence as to how they work
in practice.").
270. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to 78u-5 (West
Supp. 1996).
271. See Carrington, supra note 81, at 964.
272. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48. For a discussion of the purposes behind the Act, see
supranotes 226-30 and accompanying text.
273. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 658d (West Supp. 1996).

1997]

CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE LONG RANGE PLAN

667

about dangerous products and thereby endangering the public. 4
The legislation would have required judges in every case in which a
protective order was sought-even those where no one claimed public
access was desirable-to make a finding that the protective order
would not affect public safety.2" The political appeal of such a
measure is obvious: Who can be against public safety? The problem,
however-one to which legislators were unlikely to be sensitive-was
that the measure needlessly would have increased the work required
of federal judges by mandating intensive up-front review of every
stipulated protective order."6 The Standing Rules Committee,
however, sought and obtained a delay in the markup of the bill and
drafted an alternative proposal that provides a mechanism for the
dissolution of stipulated protective orders on the petition of one
bound by the order or by someone who has been permitted to
intervene to seek dissolution of the order. 7 That proposal still is
under consideration, but the amendment to legislate the matter
directly was defeated. 8 If this episode is any indication, intervention of the procedural rule making process in the legislative process
may slow and improve the ultimate outcome.
The LongRange Planrecognizes the problem of direct congressional
reform of procedure but does too little to solve it. The call for the
exclusive use of the Rules Enabling Act process is wise but, standing
alone, too timid. It does not address the existing "balkanization" of
procedure under the CJRA, and it relies too much on persuading
legislators who, if the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
is any indication, have little interest in the integrity of the federal
rules when political points are to be made. Legislation to place a
sunset of the plans adopted under the CJRA and to require the input
of the Judicial Conference on rule changes would have beneficial
effects.

274. See S. 374, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (1) (1995). For background on this controversy, see
Richard L. Marcus, Symposium in Honor ofEdward W. Cleary: Evidence and Procedurefor the Future.
The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 ILL. L. REV. 457, 457-63; Arthur R. Miller,
Confuentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 478-82
(1991); and Panel Discussion, ConfuentialSettlements andSealed Court Records: Necessary Safeguards
or UnwarrantedSecrecy, 78 JUDICATURE 304, 305 (1995).

275. SeeS. 374 § 2(a)(1).
276. See Inteniew with JudgePatrick E. Higginbotham: Rules Changes Under Review, THE THIRD
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CONCLUSION

It has taken Congress and the Courts a number of years to reach
the point at which they are at odds persistently over the provision of
resources and the control of procedure. It may take years for the two
branches to extricate themselves from the situation. The Long Range
Planproposes a number of important measures that eventually might
do the job. But the job is too important to wait. The federal court
system is suffering from the failure of Congress to provide the funds
necessary to accomplish the tasks that have been assigned to the
courts and from the disruptive direct procedural reforms that have
been imposed in recent years. More aggressive action, such as the
measures proposed in this Article, must be taken to end that suffering
and to permit the courts to return to the delivery of first-class,
uniform justice.

